I. Introduction
In mid-May 2001, just three months after the February crisis, Turkey started to implement a new economic program. One major integral part of the program was to overhaul the failing banking system. The rescue program for the banking sector, inevitably, increased public debt-to-GDP ratio sharply. Therefore, other targets of the program, i.e. macroeconomic discipline and the ambitious agenda for structural reforms had to be achieved under severe fiscal dominance.
Main challenge faced by the monetary authorities in the post-crisis period was the fiscal dominance caused by high public debt. There were other challenges as well:
high pass-through, backward looking pricing, and the weak banking sector. Such challenges render the Turkish monetary policy experience of the post-crisis period a rather interesting one to analyze and draw lessons from it.
In this paper we provide an account of the monetary policy experience of Turkey. 1 The following section is devoted to the challenges faced by monetary policy in the aftermath of the crisis. The implicit inflation targeting and the outcome are analyzed in the third section. In the fourth section we discuss the decision to shift to formal inflation targeting at the beginning of 2006 and the experience up to now. Final section concludes.
II. Challenges Faced by Monetary Policy in the Aftermath of the 2001 Crisis
At the beginning of 2002 the CBT announced that "… there are two nominal anchors to be used in 2002 in order to lessen the future uncertainties and to influence the expectations. These anchors are monetary targeting and inflation targeting. In 2002, we will begin by monetary targeting and at the same time implement a monetary policy focused on the 'future inflation' details of which are given below. In other words, this is an 'implicit inflation targeting.' When the conditions are favorable we will openly switch to official inflation targeting." 2 Two questions follow: What was the reason behind using two nominal anchors? Why implicit rather than formal inflation targeting? Below we discuss these issues.
II.1 Need for two nominal anchors
The currency peg system that was introduced in 2000 collapsed in February However, this meant a rise in demand for domestic currency. So, it was difficult to forecast demand for money and consequently there was a risk for frequently revising the targets for monetary aggregates. The second one was that there was a similar agreement with the IMF before the crisis. Hence, there was a great risk that the public would not find monetary targeting credible.
The third option was to implement formal inflation targeting. However, as we discuss in what follows, conditions for credibly implementing formal inflation targeting were not there. Hence, there was a dilemma: Monetary authorities were not happy with the monetary targeting regime. However, they were extremely reluctant to a premature implementation of inflation targeting not to undermine its credibility. The recipe was to announce the implementation of implicit inflation targeting and to downgrade monetary targeting which had to be in the monetary policy framework due to the stand-by agreement with the IMF.
II.2 Why implicit rather than formal inflation targeting?
The answer to this question was explicitly given by the CBT: "We will openly initiate the inflation targeting regime whenever the conditions emerge. We had to postpone the introduction of inflation targeting due to concerns about the sustainability of domestic debt…. There are two more factors why this regime has not yet been adopted. The first one is the deep-rooted habit of price setting based on past inflation….The second one is the still strong relationship between the inflation and the rate of exchange rate increase." 3 We now turn to these and related issues.
II.2.1 Fiscal dominance
The periods following recent currency crises have generally witnessed a hike in public debt. d Quarterly ratios are calculated by using the sum of the current and last three quarters of GDP. Wallace (1981) , when public debt is high and the real rate of return on government securities in excess of the economy's growth rate, tightening the monetary policy by reducing the growth rate of money can result in higher, rather than lower inflation.
Under these conditions, a contractionary monetary policy will initially lower seigniorage revenue and require that additional debt be issued; an increase in the deficit and the following rise in the stock of debt will eventually require an increase in seigniorage. This situation has been dubbed as "fiscal dominance of monetary policy".
Why should an inflation targeting central bank afraid of high public debt? The logic behind such a fear is as follows: An inflation targeting central bank should respond to an increase in the probability of an upsurge in future inflation by raising its policy rate. If, in a highly indebted economy the pass-through effect is significant, developments that increase concerns about debt sustainability, would not only increase interest rates, but also weaken the domestic currency. An increase in the probability of debt repudiation, on the one hand, would cause new subscribers to ask for higher rates to compensate for an increase in default risk. On the other hand, demand for foreign currency denominated assets would increase; hence the weakening of the domestic currency would occur. Consequently, a central bank that raises its policy rate in response to a potential rise in inflation due to weakening of the currency faces two related problems in these conditions. First, a rise in its overnight rate could signal to the markets that "things are not going in the right direction", which could obviously increase the perceived default risk and hence, the real interest rate and exchange rate.
Second, both indirectly with the first effect and directly by raising the cost of borrowing, such a response in policy would increase the debt burden of the treasury and jeopardize debt sustainability. The domestic currency would depreciate in these circumstances, which is inflationary if the pass-through effect is significant. This means the plan to increase the short-term interest rate to cope with inflationary pressures would backfire.
A counter argument would be that a central bank which does its job by raising interest rates will be credible, and such a credible policy decision will more than offset the negative effects on inflation stated above. Analyzing which argument is correct is not an issue that this paper addresses. However, the probability of the backfiring of raising interest rates in such circumstances is not something that can be disregarded immediately. Given this probability, the effectiveness of inflation targeting in such economies is asymmetric: Cutting policy rates does not pose such problems (provided that such a cut is warranted by the inflation outlook), whereas raising them does. (2005) and Favero and Giavazzi (2005) are valid for Turkey also.
inertia in inflation can arise. show that the impact of such implicit indexation mechanisms on the evolution of the inflation rate in Turkey in the periods preceding the 2001 crisis was considerable.
II.2.3 High pass-through
By high pass-through it is generally meant that one of the most important determinants of future path of inflation is the rate of change of the exchange rate. This occurs firstly through the impact of import prices on costs, secondly through shaping inflationary expectations and thirdly via various indexation mechanisms. 5 In a small open emerging economy, a significant change in the direction of capital flows not stemming from policies followed by that country, has the potential to affect the exchange rate and hence the inflation rate. Provided that such a shock persists for some time, inflation targets can be missed. Kara and Öğünç (2005) and provide estimates for the exchange rate pass-through effect in Turkey. They show that for the period 1994-2001 the pass-through was quick (completed in six months) and large.
II.2.4 The structure of the financial sector
A major concern of a central bank that attempts to implement an inflation targeting program is whether the country's banking system can properly and safely react to policy signals given by the central bank. If banks fail to react properly, they may curb the effectiveness of the monetary policy. 6 On the other hand, if their reaction 5 It should also be pointed out that Turkey can be considered as an endogenously dollarized economy, a property that feeds the pass-through indirectly. 6 One may imagine that banks may not be able to understand the signals given by the central bank. Such a situation was highly unlikely in the case of Turkey. The Central Bank had a long experience of communicating with the banking community. Therefore, despite the existence of endangers the safety of the banking system, then the central bank will find itself in the position of placing financial stability ahead of price stability. Recent experience of the developing countries, as well as Turkey's own, indicate that a liberalized financial system, unless supervised carefully and forcefully may be quite vulnerable to crises.
Banks, in general tend to assume high risks, without increasing their capital base.
Growth and employment concerns of the governments induce them to overlook such tendencies and/or undermine their dangers. Under such circumstances, central banks, inevitably, refrain from taking those decisions that may be effective in controlling inflation but may endanger financial stability. Obviously the solution of this problem lies in strengthening the supervisory environment to enforce an effective risk management constraint on banking system and increase bank capital.
Turkey went into a deepest financial crisis of her recent history in February
2001
. 7 The negative balance sheet effect of the crisis was detrimental not only for banks but also for non-financial corporations. The seriousness of the situation forced the authorities to take rather drastic measures, some long awaited, to restructure the Turkish banking system. The crisis, although impaired the functioning of the Turkish banking system, also created an opportunity for making it viable in a globally integrated economic environment.
problems of the sufficiency of the information thus revealed, "central bank language" was not alien to banking community. On the other hand, as was demonstrated in Ersel (2002) , banks were capable of taking macroeconomic information into account in forming their major managerial decisions.
On Reforming the state owned banks drew considerable attention due to its high cost as well as its impact on the domestic politics of the country. However, this pillar of the BSRP is merely an intermediary step stone towards achieving its final aim, i.e.
changing the mode of operations of private banks. The program was based on three main pillars.
The first pillar was reforming state owned banks. The program aimed at solving the problem of the accumulated debt of the Treasury and restructuring these banks. The Treasury issued government bonds to securitize such debts, capital injected in these banks and the management of these banks were transferred to a joint board of directors with the mission of restructuring. State-owned banks were made more prudent in identifying their problem loans to secure their transparency. As a result of this policy, the non-performing loan figures for state-owned banks as well as provisions for them increased considerably. In this process two major state owned banks were also merged.
The second pillar was strengthening private banks. The first problem that was (Table 2) . The second problem that the authorities had to deal with was the weakness of the banking system. The 2001 crisis as well as the developments that led to it negatively affected the banks' financial structure and profitability. Being aware of the vitally important role of the banking system in the future growth path of the Turkish economy, the authorities gave priority to securing its safety and soundness. First, they reduced the foreign exchange risks of banks by allowing them to substitute their TL denominated government bonds with FX denominated ones. Second, they strengthened their capital base by asking banks to satisfy strictly the minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8 % through raising capital from its shareholders. Third, they launched a financial restructuring program for those non-financial corporations that are distressed but viable to prevent non-performed loans to shoot up.
The third pillar was establishing the conditions for a sound functioning banking system by securing the autonomy of the supervisory authority, enhancing its technical capabilities and adopting the international (notably European Union) standards in banking legislation. As can be seen from Table 3 , the 2001 crisis adversely affected the Turkish banking system. Its size, relative to the country's GNP, sharply declined, coupled with a similar decline in credit/GNP ratio. The "flight from credit" phenomenon ended in
2004, when the economy started to exhibit rather strong growth performance and the banking system expanded.
III. Implicit Inflation Targeting and the Outcome: 2002-2005
At the beginning of 2002, the CBT announced that it was going to implement implicit inflation targeting. The core of formal inflation targeting is included in this framework. That is, firstly, given that the main aim of the CBT is to achieve price stability, short-term interest rates had been changed based purely on the inflation outlook. Secondly, whenever a decision was taken on interest rates, the rationale behind that decision was explained to the public in press releases. However, up to the beginning of 2005, some elements of formal inflation targeting were missing: for example, the public did not know the meeting dates of the monetary policy committee, there was not any voting in the monetary policy committee and final decision on the policy rates was taken by a small group consisting of the governor, one vice governor and the general directors of the markets department and research and monetary policy department. This group was taking the discussions in the monetary policy committee into consideration when giving their final decision. In the following sections we discuss the developments in this period.
III.1 Economic program
Since the beginning of the program, there has been substantial progress in structural reforms. Just after the crisis the CBT gained instrument independence.
Along with the above mentioned restructuring of the financial sector, the public sector has also been undergoing a reform process. Redundant positions (more than 10% of total state economic enterprises' employment) were eliminated. A hiring limit was implemented. The agricultural support system was re-designed. Independent regulatory and supervisory agencies were formed. Steps were taken to enhance transparency, budget discipline and accountability in the public sector. Various laws were enacted to improve the investment environment.
Throughout the post-crisis period, the primary budget surplus-to-GNP ratio targets were rather ambitious. Despite a temporary deviation due to political chaos in target. Simultaneously, the public sector reduced its deficit to 0.6% of the GDP at the end of the second quarter of 2006 from 15.1% of the GDP in 2001. Additionally, the risk exposure of public debt stock had decreased through a successful debt management policy: the share of foreign exchange denominated (or indexed) debt in the total public debt had also been reduced considerably. Similarly, the floating rate part of domestic debt stock had shrunk significantly.
One of the most important elements of the program that was implemented after the crisis is the floating exchange rate system. This regime was one of the necessary conditions for the smooth operation of the implicit inflation targeting. The exchange rate policy of the CBT was made more transparent at the beginning of 2002. The CBT stressed that it would not interfere with the level or trend of the exchange rate. It also announced that it could intervene in case of excess volatility. Based on this main principle, however, the CBT has also pledged to limit the incidence of such intervention. In addition, at the beginning of 2002, the CBT explicitly instructed the markets that; first, on condition of strict implementation of the program and in the absence of large external shocks, the dollarization process would lose its importance, eventually leading to a reverse dollarization process. Second, favorable balance of payments conditions would probably arise. Third, although the exchange rate regime was floating, the level of foreign exchange reserves was important due to three main reasons. Turkey had debt repayments forthcoming to the IMF. International investors gave a special emphasize to the level of reserves. The CBT wanted to clear its balance sheet of some types of foreign exchange liabilities, such as deposits of workers abroad.
Fourth, given the importance of the level of reserves (in this case, regardless of the exchange rate system), provided that at least one of the conditions stated in the first two items materialized, it was going to build-up reserves through rule based, transparent, and pre-announced purchase auctions.
III.2 Effects of fiscal dominance
By the implementation of the program that rests on fiscal and monetary discipline and structural reforms the fiscal dominance has started to loose its importance. However, it was a challenge especially up to 2005 starting from the aftermath of the crisis. In this period, the CBT raised its overnight rate just once -in
July 2001-and the reactions of the markets were adverse. The interest rates in all maturities moved upwards and the lira depreciated. A positive and close relationship between the daily evolution of Eurobond spreads 8 , the exchange rate (value of lira against an equal weighted basket of euro and dollar), and the secondary market Treasury bill rate is another manifestation of fiscal dominance. (2005) and Favero and Giavazzi (2005) show that in Brazil in early 2000's a similar phenomenon were observed.
III.3 What happened to the financial sector?
Despite the positive developments in the Turkish banking system after its major restructuring in early 2000s, financial stability is still a concern for the CBT. Such an increase in both domestic and external competition in banking exerted considerable downward pressure on bank profitability. Net interest income to total assets ratio exhibited a declining trend during the years of economic recovery, and profitability declined (Table 6) .
Turkey, on the other hand, was among the few countries that were most adversely affected by the developments in the world financial markets in May-June 2006. As can be seen from Table 7 the impact of these developments on banking system was significantly negative. Banks suffered from considerable equity erosion and revealed their balance sheets vulnerability to exchange rate movements. It is true that banks were able to hedge, at least partially, against such risks; therefore once the off balance sheet items are taken into account, the overall effect of the May-June 2006 shock is much less. However, structural nature of the problem will most likely induce bank managements to react over cautiously. All in all, during the phase of the recovery the declining profitability of the Turkish banking system 9 , coupled with the increased reliance of the private sector (including banks) on financing themselves from external sources, adversely affected the efficiency of the monetary policy.
III.4 Outcome
At the end of 2001, the program started to show its strength; inflation expectations have followed a downward trend, the inflation rate declined to one digit levels from high two-digit levels of the 1990s, the public debt-to-GDP ratio has been significantly reduced. The Turkish economy first started to recover and then to grow a considerable amount despite the extremely tight fiscal policy. There is no doubt that this phenomenon is not unique to Turkey; it was observed in some other countries in the 80s, leading to the development of so-called "expansionary fiscal contractions" in economic literature (Table 1) 10 . As documented by Akıncı et al. (2005) dollarization has started to decline. This created an opportunity for the CBT to increase its reserves through foreign exchange purchase auctions (almost 33 billion dollars).
9 See Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, Chapter 8) for a discussion of the banking system related factors that influences that efficiency of the monetary policy. 10 See, for example, Giavazzi et al. (2000) .
However, one should also note that there were temporary deviations from this positive main trend. As discussed above, the main reason is, despite sound policies and reforms, economies that have inherited a host of problems due to imprudent policies of the past need a considerable period of time to overcome these problems. During this period, such economies remain vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment due to changes in international and domestic risk factors. Even a brief glance at the evolution of secondary market interest rates, the exchange rate, and Eurobond spreads would reveal this fact. Regarding the interest rate and spread, while the main trend is downwards, there were sharp increases in both of the variables from time to time. Additionally, a similar phenomenon applies for the exchange rate. The following are taken from the CBT (2005): "…In time, harmonization with the floating exchange rate regime increased and considerable progress was made in the formation of a suitable environment for the transition to an inflation targeting regime: all inflation target were met, confidence was heightened and inflation expectations converged with the targets. Today inflation is at its lowest in thirty years. While debates on the sustainability of public debt stock used to be at the top of the economic agenda in the past, this is no longer the case. Worries pertaining to the continuity of fiscal discipline have eased considerably. Financial markets started to become deeper, and the financial sector has become less fragile.
Progress made towards economic stability started the reverse-dollarization process, and although it was interrupted from time to time and more progress is necessary, the weight of Turkish lira denominated investments began to increase in portfolio preferences.
The inflation target (jointly with the government) was set as a point target.
12
The inflation rate measured by the headline consumer price index was used to define the target. The end-year targets for 2006, 2007 and 2008 were set as 5%, 4% and 4%, respectively. The CBT explicitly stated that it would assess upward or downward deviations from the target on equal footing.
13
According to the provision in article 42 of its law the CBT has to submit information and the measures to be taken to the government in case of such deviations from the target. In order to activate such a mechanism the CBT defined a symmetric 'uncertainty band' around the target. It emphasized that such a band should not be perceived as a band for the inflation target. This band was set as 2 percentage point in both directions. However, since the stand-by agreement with the IMF was continuing and such agreements need performance criteria for the monetary policy, the CBT announced a quarterly inflation path consistent with the target and consequently set uncertainty bands for the end of each quarter.
It was also emphasized that monetary policy would not instantly react to the temporary impacts of large exogenous shocks on inflation. Note that as stated above …. Following the agreement with the IMF, the announcement of the medium-term program and the start of the negotiation process with the EU for full membership, the predictability of fundamental macroeconomic variables further increased.
During the period 2001-2005, very significant steps were taken pertaining to the improvement of the institutional infrastructure of monetary policy…. The Central Bank rendered its institutional framework more efficient, defined its communications policy in a more transparent way, expanded its information set and improved its inflation forecast methods. Besides these factors, significant progress was made during this time in the area of Central Bank independence, pertaining to its practice. … All these developments pointed to the fact that the pre-conditions of the inflation targeting regime had, to a large extent, been met and the appropriate time was approaching…." 12 The general framework of the inflation targeting regime was made public on December 5, 2005. This section heavily draws on that announcement (CBT, 2005) . 13 Note that in the implicit inflation targeting period, the end-year inflation rates were always realized below the targets. The CBT tolerated this development in order to increase perceptions that the disinflation process would be persistent. inflation targets for a three-year period was announced at the outset. Hence, there is a medium-term perspective for the inflation targeting regime, which gives some flexibility to the CBT to tolerate short-term effects of such exogenous shocks provided that medium-term target is not under jeopardy.
The CBT stated that a pre-announced target would only be changed only when very sharp and long-term deviations from the target were expected or medium-term targets no longer make sense due to factors beyond the control of monetary policy.
However, temporary shocks could change inflation forecasts rather than inflation targets.
In the second quarter of 2006, both due to turbulence in international markets stemming from rising international interest rates and decreasing risk appetite of foreign investors and increasing political tensions in Turkey, domestic currency depreciated sharply, secondary market rates and the credit risk of Turkey moved upwards. Rising exchange rates and sharp increase in petroleum prices caused a rise in inflation.
Buoyant domestic demand played a role in this outcome as well. Based on these developments a significant deterioration in inflation expectations is observed (Table 3) .
These negative developments forced CBT to raise its policy rate.
The May-June 2006 turbulence in the financial markets as well as their impact on the financial statements of banks indicates that the Turkish financial system has not fully overcome the instability problem. In the short run, this implies that the central bank is compelled to implement its monetary policy, can not, and should not implement monetary policy without taking into account the constraints that the banking system is imposing on. In a longer run perspective, the present state of the Turkish banking system indicates the need for further strengthening (in terms of injecting capital and possibly through increasing average scale) of Turkish banking.
V. Conclusion
Even programs that are based on sound macroeconomic fundamentals in economies with an inherited high public debt stock are prone to risks stemming from macroeconomic misbehavior in the past. Shocks that increase concerns about the continuation of the current macroeconomic framework can push such economies to a bad equilibrium, in which there is high inflation, high real interest rates and sharp depreciation, from a good equilibrium with low inflation, low real interest rates and a stable currency. The possibility of multiple equilibria limits the efficiency of inflation targeting in such economies.
The Turkish experience of inflation targeting once again shows that choosing the right time for a radical change in the conduct of monetary policy, i.e. switching to formal inflation targeting, is crucial for the success of the new regime. However, one should also note that, being too much perfectionist in this regards will be counterproductive, since there is never a 'right time'. There will be always some elements missing, but one should seek for a balance between these missing elements and the elements ready to use.
The period of implicit inflation targeting indicated that the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies is essential for obtaining the desired results. Without a disciplined fiscal policy framework, there is never a 'right time' for starting to implement inflation targeting. Hence, the correct timing is strongly determined by the degree of fiscal dominance.
